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This article analyzes determinants of agricultural price pro-
tection for one important food, wheat, in a pooled cross-country
and time-series analysis. For the aggregate sample it is shown
that wheat price protection increases with a rising level of
economic development and with a growing import dependency in
wheat. Beyond this general pattern, the paper shows that the
variation in wheat price protection can be significantly better
explained if qualitative variables are introduced additionally
into the model. For example, in Japan, in the Northern countries
and during the commodity price boom (197 3-75), wheat price
protection followed a specific pattern. Income elasticities and
import-dependency elasticities of wheat price protection are
computed for all countries in 1968-80, and additionally for
various sub-regions and sub-periods.- 1 -
Introduction
There is a growing interest in the measurement of the levels, the
determinants and the costs of agricultural protection within
cross-country analyses [Anderson/Hayami (1986), Honma/Hayami
(1986), Kerr (1985), World Bank (1986), FAO (1987), OECD (1987)].
On the determinants of agricultural protection, econometric evi-
dence from cross-country studies is available for total agri-
cultural protection in selected country groups. Results are
provided for Asia in Anderson/Hayami (1986) and for indu-
strialized countries in Honma/Hayami (1986). Two other studies
refer to a broader country sample including developed and
developing countries [de Haen/Schafer (1987) , Balisacan/Roumasset
(1987)]. Their results indicate a less satisfactory explanation
of the cross-country variation in protection levels when both
industrialized and less-developed countries are taken into
account .
This study extends the discussion on the determinants of agri-
cultural protection in two major respects:
1. The studies cited above are not related to individual agri-
cultural products. A product-specific approach seems neces-
sary, however, as protection varies considerably between
agricultural products [World Bank (1986), OECD (1987a)]. An
aggregate approach for total agriculture obscures these
differences. This article tries to elaborate major deter-
minants of agricultural price protection for one important
agricultural product - wheat. Although several studies are
available which measure wheat price protection in various
countries [e.g., Bigman (1985, pp. 101 et seq.), Byerlee/Sain
(1986)], none of them estimates econometrically the deter-
minants of wheat price protection across countries.
2. The influence of economic development and import dependency on
price protection is elaborated in more detail than in earlier
studies. Quantitative approaches have ignored these deter-
minants totally [Anderson/Hayami (1986) , Honma/Hayami (1986) ]- 2 -
or partly [Balisacan/Roumasset (1986)] or have measured their
influence in an aggregate number within a cross-country study
for one specific year [de Haen/Schafer (1987)]. In this paper,
a pooled cross-country and time-series approach is used. This
allows it to analyze the impacts of economic development and
import dependency not only on levels of protection across
countries but also over time. As the uniformity of the re-
gression coefficients is additionally tested by slope-dummy
variables, it is also possible to detect region-specific and
period-specific differences in these impacts.
It will be shown that a fairly high share of the cross-country
variation in wheat price protection can be explained. This holds
true not only for a country sample of industrialized countries
but also for the total sample, including both developed and
developing countries. An important reason for this result is that
a more extensive use is made of qualitative independent variables
than in former studies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 explains the theore-
tical model and the measurement of the variables entering the
model. The hypotheses will be put forward that price protection
increases with a rising level of economic development and with a
decreasing level of self-sufficiency for wheat. These hypotheses
are tested in Section 2 on the basis of a pooled cross-country
and time-series approach for 38 wheat-importing countries in the
period 1968-80. The results indicate that the estimated re-
gression coefficients are not constant across countries or
between sub-periods. Therefore, the empirical analysis is ex-
tended in Section 3 by introducing structural differences in the
protection pattern between countries and sub-periods by various
intercept-dummy and slope-dummy variables. Elasticities of wheat
price protection with respect to per-capita income and wheat
import dependency are derived for various countries, country
groups and sub-periods. Finally, conclusions for further research
are drawn and major results are summarized.- 3 -
1 Hypotheses and Data
The basic theoretical model rests on two hypotheses:
1. Wheat price protection rises with an increasing level of eco-
nomic development as indicated by GDP per capita. The reason
is that a rich country is more likely to be in a position to
ignore the economic advantages which the international di-
vision of labor provides and to protect the agricultural sec-
tor from international competition. It is expected that this
argument holds not only true for agriculture as a whole, but
also for the wheat sector.
2. Nearly all countries stress the self-sufficiency goal for
foodcrops. It is expected here that the wheat sector will be
protected more the lower the degree of self-sufficiency in
wheat or the higher the degree of import dependency in wheat.
One reason for this hypothesis is that the self-sufficiency
goal might become more important for policy makers when import
dependency is particularly high. A second reason is that a
given level of price protection is cheaper to realize for the
government, ceteris paribus, when the self-sufficiency ratio
is low than when it is high.
Formally, this implies that the following basic model is formu-
lated:
(1) PR = f(GDPC, IMPDEP)
PR indicates wheat price protection, GDPC is GDP per capita and
IMPDEP is import dependency in wheat. PR is measured with nominal
protection coefficients for wheat, i.e. as the ratio between
domestic wheat prices and border prices for wheat. The data on
nominal protection coefficients are corrected for transport costs
and are taken from Bigman (1985) . GDP per capita is used as an
indicator for economic development. It is widely acknowledged in
the literature [Gilbert/Kravis (1954), Kravis/Heston/Summers
(1978)] that official exchange rates are inappropriate as a.basis- 4 -
for international income comparisons. Hence, real GDP data based
on purchasing-power parities are used from the International
Comparison Project [Summers/Heston (1984)]. Import dependency is
defined as the percentage share of wheat imports in wheat con-
sumption. Wheat consumption is defined as the sum of wheat
production and wheat imports. An unlagged import-dependency
variable would create simultaneity problems in the basic model.
This is because wheat imports and wheat production can be
expected to change with varying wheat price protection levels.
Therefore, import dependency is specified as a one-year lagged
variable. It can then be regarded as a truly exogenous variable
in the model. Data for wheat imports and wheat production are
taken from the FAO Trade and Production Yearbooks. All the un-
lagged variables are available for the period 1968-80 and the
lagged variable for 1967-79. The country sample includes 38
2 wheat-importing countries , both developed and developing.
In a first step, the basic model will be estimated on the basis
of the pooled cross-country and time-series data set for all
countries as well as for all industrialized and all developing
countries. Separate estimates will be carried out for the sub-
periods 1968-72 and 1976-80, i.e. periods excluding the phase of
a commodity price boom in the world market (1973-75).
2 Empirical Evidence on the Influence of Income and Import
Dependency on Wheat Price Protection
Table 1 indicates how the level of economic development and im-
port dependency in wheat affected wheat price protection . The
major results are as follows:
1. In the period 1968-80, both hypotheses of the theoretical
model are clearly confirmed. Wheat price protection increases
with a rising level of economic development and with a growing
import dependency in wheat. This holds true for the whole
sample of 38 wheat-import ing countries as well as for the
industrialized and the developing countries within this
sample.- 5 -




Determinants of Wheat Price Protection








































































































***,**»* Statistically different from zero at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% level of significance.
a Wheat price protection is measured with the nominal protection coefficient (in %), Q3P-per-capita data are taken
frcm the International Comparison Project (Sunmers/Heston 1984) and measured in S par capita. Import dependency is
defined as the percentage share of wheat imports in the sum of wheat production and imports. The import-dependency
variable is introduced with a one-year lag. Values in one parenthesis are t-values. Values in two parentheses are
elasticities, evaluated at mean values. R
2 is the corrected coefficient of determination, F is the F-value and DF
indicates the degrees of freedom.
Source: Own computations on the basis of data from Bigman (1985); FAQ, FAO Production Yearbook. Rome, various years;
FAO, FAO Trade Yearbook. Rome, various years; Sunners/Heston (1984).- 6 -
2. For the total sample of 38 countries, an increase in the PPP-
corrected GDP per capita by 100$ raised the nominal coeffi-
cients of wheat price protection by 1.46 percentage points. An
increase in the import dependency in wheat by one percentage
point led to a rise in the nominal coefficient of wheat price
protection by 0.55 percentage points. The regression coeffi-
cients are clearly higher in the second sub-period, 1976-80,
than in the first sub-period, 1968-72. This means that the
influence of economic development and import dependency in
wheat on wheat price protection became stronger over time.
3. The regression coefficients for the industrialized countries
have the same sign and are also significantly different from
zero, but are higher than those for the total sample. For
example, an increase in the PPP-corrected GDP per capita by
100$ raised wheat price protection by 2.6 percentage points.
Analogously, a rise in the import dependency in wheat by one
percentage point caused a 0.935 percentage-point increase in
wheat price protection. It is striking that the influence of
the import status became stronger over time.
4. Developing countries with a higher real GDP per capita tended
to have also a higher nominal protection for wheat than others
with a lower GDP per capita. However, this statement is only
valid for the whole period 1968-80 and for the second sub-
period (1976-80). In the first subperiod, 1968-72, poorer
developing countries still supported their wheat producers
more strongly than richer developing countries. In any case,
the income effect on wheat price protection is clearly smaller
than for industrialized countries. There is a positive re-
lationship between import dependency in wheat and wheat price
protection in developing countries just as in industrialized
countries. The impact arising from the import status, however,
is again smaller in developing countries.- 7 -
5. Interesting additional information on the influence of
economic development and import dependency in wheat is
available through the calculation of wheat price protection
elasticities. A wheat price protection elasticity measures the
percentage change in price protection caused by a one percent
change in an exogenous variable. Such elasticities, evaluated
at the mean values of the variables, are provided in Table 1
in two parentheses under the regression coefficients. Both the
income elasticity and the import-dependency elasticity of
wheat price protection are positive but relatively low. With
one exception - the income elasticity in 1976-80 for in-
dustrialized countries - the point estimates indicate an in-
elastic reaction of protection levels. For 1968-80 and the
total sample of 38 wheat-importing countries, the income
elasticity of wheat price protection is 0.31 and the import-
dependency elasticity is 0.20. The import dependency elasti-
cities are of the same order in industrialized and developing
countries. However, the income elasticity of wheat price
protection is clearly higher in industrialized than in
developing countries: 0.84 as opposed to 0.10 in the period
1968-80.
The overall performance of the basic model is satisfactory with
respect to the t- and F-statistics. The basic hypotheses are
confirmed and in one case rejected at high levels of statistical
significance. However, the model yields unsatisfactory R
2 values,
especially for developing countries and all countries. This
suggests that the model suffers from an omitted-variables
problem. Therefore, the basic model will be extended in order to
take structural differences between countries and periods into
account.- 8 -
3 Empirical Evidence on the Influence of Income, Import De-
pendency and Structural Differences Between Countries and
Periods on Wheat Price Protection
The following stylized facts on the differential agricultural
price protection across countries are often stressed in the
4 literature :
1. Industrialized countries protect agricultural producers
more strongly than developing countries.
2. Japan protects its agriculture more strongly than most other
countries.
3. Northern countries like Norway, Finland or Switzerland protect
their agricultural sectors more than most other, countries.
4. The EC protects agriculture more than most other countries.
5. East Asian newly industrializing countries increased agri-
cultural protection significantly with economic growth and now
protect their sectors more than most other countries.
Moreover, it is well-known that world market prices for agri-
culture were boosted during the period of the commodity price
boom, 1973-75, and followed an upward trend during the period
under consideration. This leads to two additional hypotheses:
1. The particularly high denominator of the nominal protection
coefficient in the years 1973-75 is responsible for an agri-
cultural price protection being lower in the period of the
commodity price boom 1973-75 than during the other years. This
can be expected as most countries have decoupled producer
prices from international prices and do not fix the nominal
protection coefficient.
2. The trend factor in world agricultural prices is responsible
for agricultural price protection being higher in the post-
commodity boom period than in the pre-commodity boom period.- 9 -
Some of these stylized facts have been confirmed for individual
years in the empirical literature [FAO (1987), OECD (1987)]. It
is tested here whether the stylized facts are valid after having
introduced income and import dependency as major economic deter-
minants of wheat price protection. Dummy variables are used in
order to characterize structural differences in wheat price
protection between regions and sub-periods. Usually, only
intercept dummies are used . However, this is an a-priori
restriction that is not accepted here. Theoretically, it is
possible that the influence of income and import dependency on
wheat price protection differs among regions and among sub-
periods. Therefore, structural differences are tested here by
introducing intercept-dummy as well as slope-dummy variables .
Empirical results are summarized in Table 2.
First, equation 1 confirms the structural differences in wheat
price protection between industrialized and developing countries
as indicated in Table 1. The coefficients of the intercept dummy
and the slope dummies for industrialized countries are signi-
ficantly different from zero. An increase in the PPP-corrected
GDP per capita by the same amount in industrialized and develop-
ing countries leads to a significantly stronger increase in the
nominal protection coefficient of industrialized countries.
Analogously, an increase in import dependency by one percentage
point in both developing and industrialized countries causes a
significantly stronger increase in wheat price protection in
7
industrialized countries .
Many additional findings can be derived, however, if the groups
"industrialized countries" and "developing countries" are further
disaggregated and if various sub-periods of 1968-80 are distin-
guished. The variables D2 to D7 are introduced in a first step as
intercept dummies. D2 characterizes Japan, D3 the Northern non-EC
countries Norway, Finland and Switzerland, D4 the period of the
commodity price boom (1973-75), D5 the Asian newly industrializ-
ing countries Korea, Singapore and Malaysia. D6 stands for the
period 1976-80 and D7 for, EC .countries. It can be seen that these
structural dummy variables lead to a significant improvement of- 10 -
Table 2: The Influence of Income, Import Dependency and Structural Differences Between Countries and Periods on Wheat






























































































































































****** statistically different from zero at the 0.1%, 1%, 10% level of significance.
Wheat price protection, income and import dependency in wheat are defined and measured as in Table 1. R
2, F and DF
are also defined as in Table 1. Values in parentheses are t-values. Dl is a dummy variable indicating the country
status: 1 - industrialized countries, 0 - less developed countries. The country list of the Development Assistance
Committee of the OECD is used. D2 is the Japan dummy with 1 for Japan and 0 otherwise. D3 is the dummy variable for
Northern non-EC countries with 1 for Norway, Finland and Switzerland and 0 otherwise. D4 is the dunmy variable for the
period of the commodity price boon with 1 for the years 1973, 1974 and 1975 and 0 in all other years. D5 is the dummy
variable for Asian NICs with 1 for Korea, Singapore and Malaysia and 0 otherwise. D6 is a dummy variable for 1976-80
with 1 in this period and 0 in all other years. D7 is the EC dummy with 1 for France, FR Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands in 1968-80, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1974-80 and 0 for all other countries in the whole period
under consideration. Of course, the income and import dependency variables refer to the respective region or period
when they are combined with the variables D2 to D7. - This variable had to be excluded as it was nearly perfectly
correlated with another exogenous variable.
Source: See Table 1.-li-
the econometric results. In equation (2) of Table 2, where the
dummy variables were taken into account, the R
2 value more than
doubles compared with the first equation in Table 1, where dum-
mies were excluded. More than 50% of the variation in wheat price
protection across countries and over time can be explained by
income, import dependency in wheat and the intercept dummies D2
to D7 (R
2 = 0.51). The following structural differences between
periods and regions can be derived from the results of equation
2:
1. Apart from the general increase in wheat price protection with
income and import dependency in wheat, there are remarkable
differences in the levels of protection between regions and
sub-periods.
2. Japan's protection level is significantly higher than in the
other countries: by 155 percentage points.
3. Wheat price protection is significantly higher in the Northern
countries Norway, Finland and Switzerland than in the other
countries: by 62 percentage points.
4. During the period of the commodity price boom, 1973-75, wheat
price protection was significantly lower than in the other
years: by 56 percentage points.
5. In the Asian newly-industrializing countries Korea, Singapore
and Malaysia, wheat price protection was significantly above
that in the other countries: by 32 percentage points.
6. Wheat price protection was somewhat lower in the period 1976-
80 than in the other years. It was somewhat higher in the EC
than in the other countries. Both intercept dummies, however,
were not statistically different from zero at the 10% level.- 12 -
In equation (3) of Table 2, D2 to D7 are introduced additionally
as slope-dummy variables. This is done in order to test whether
the pattern, which governs the influence of income and import
dependency on price protection, varies between regions and sub-
periods. The. comparison with equation (2) shows that the R
2 value
rises by more than 10% due to the introduction of the slope
dummies: from 0.51 to 0.58. The regression coefficients of
various slope dummies are significantly different from zero. This
is especially the case when dummies were multiplied by the income
variable. A problem with equation (3) is that it obviously
suffers from multicollinearity problems. There is a fairly high
coefficient of determination, given cross-sectional standards,
but more than 10 regression coefficients are not statistically
different from zero. Therefore, a stepwise regression procedure
is utilized in equation (4) . Only those independent variables
from equation (3) are considered which contribute most to the
explanation of the variation in wheat protection levels. The
regression coefficients of all included variables are stati-
stically different from zero at least at the 90% level. The
following findings are striking:
1. Equation (4) explains about 60% of the variation in protection
levels across countries and over time. This is a relatively
high share given a sample that includes both developed and
developing countries. Four variables alone explain 5 2% of the
variation in protection levels: the dummy variable charac-
terizing the commodity price boom (D4) , and the slope dummy
variables for Japan, the Northern non-EC countries and the
Asian NICs, combined with the respective income variables (D2
x INCOME, D3 X INCOME, D5 X INCOME).
2. In each identified country group wheat price protection de-
pends to a different extent on income. Generally, wheat price
protection increases significantly with income in Japan, in
the Northern non-EC countries, in the Asian newly-indu-
strialized countries and in the EC. An increase in the PPP-
corrected GDP by 100$ leads to the strongest rise in the
nominal protection coefficient in Japan (by 14.1 percentageBibfiofhelc
des Institute fur Weitwirtschaft
- 13 -
points), followed by the Asian NICs (1.7 percentage points),
the Northern non-EC countries (1.3 percentage points) and the
EC countries (0.3 percentage points). If we compare these
coefficients with the aggregate coefficient for all countries
in Table 1, it can be seen that wheat price protection rose
faster with income in Japan, in the Asian NICs and the
Northern non-EC countries.
3. The slope dummies, which were combined with the import-de-
pendency variable, proved to be significant in only one case:
in Japan, a lower import dependency was followed by a higher
protection level in wheat. This is contrary to the positive
overall influence of import dependency on wheat price protec-
tion. In the other regions and in the sub-periods charac-
terized by D3 to D7, no statistically significant deviation
from the general pattern occurred.
Two more general and indicative conclusions can be drawn from the
equations (3) and (4):
1. Wheat price protection is dependent on income not only across
a broad country sample but also for individual countries and
small country groups over time. The intensity of this rela-
tionship varies across countries and country groups.
2. The level of wheat price protection depends on the import
dependency in wheat more from a cross-country point of view
than over time for individual countries and small country
groups. Across all countries, a clearly positive influence of
import dependency on price protection could be established.
For individual countries and small country groups, however,
the regression coefficients of the respective slope dummies
were negative, only being statistically significant for Japan.
This indicates that the positive influence arising from import
dependency on wheat price protection is weaker or does not
exist at all at the country level. It seems that cross-country- 14 -
differences in import dependency, and not changes in self-
sufficiency over time, drive the overall positive coefficient.
The pattern of wheat price protection which has been highlighted
is basically confirmed by separate results for the industrialized
and the developing countries. Selected econometric estimates are
presented in Table 3. Equations (1) and (3) take all relevant
intercept and slope dummies into account, equations (2) and (4)
only those which contribute the most to the explanation of the
cross-country variation in protection. In equations (2) and (4),
only those variables are included whose parameters are at least
at the 95% level significantly different from zero. The following
additional results can be derived from Table 3:
1. The explanation of the variation in wheat price protection
across countries and over time is much more satisfactory for
industrialized than for developing countries. More than 80% of
the variation in protection levels among industrialized
countries can be explained by equation (2). This share is
extraordinarily high for cross-sectional analyses. Three
variables alone explain some 70% of the variation in wheat
price protection:
- the intercept dummy for the period of the commodity price
boom (D4), and
- the slope dummies for Japan and the Northern non-EC
countries, combined with the respective income variables (D2
x INCOME, D3 x INCOME).
Again, it is striking that various slope dummies reveal signi-
ficant differences in the regression coefficients between
regions and between sub-periods. Wheat price protection within
industrialized countries depends to a different extent on
income and import dependency across countries and over time.
For developing countries, only 39% of the variation in pro-
tection levels can be explained by equation (4). The relative-- 15 -
Table 3: The Influence of Income, Import Dependency and Structural Differences Between Countries and Periods on Wheat
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***,**,* Statistically different frcro zero at the 0.1%, 1%, 10% level of significance.
a Wheat price protection, income and import dependency in wheat are defined as in Table 1. R
2, F and DF are also de-
fined as in Table 1. Values in parentheses are t-values. On the definitions of D2 to D7, see Table 2. D8 distinguishes
"typical" from "untypical" developing countries. Untypical developing countries (D8=l) are oil-exporting high income
and upper-middle income developing countries according to the World Bank Classification. Typical developing countries
(D8=0) are those ranking below upper-middle income developing countries. - This variable had to be excluded as it
was nearly perfectly correlated with another exogenous variable.
Source: See Table 1.- 16 -
ly weaker results for developing countries are consistent with
earlier findings of other authors. Even in the sample of
developing countries, however, several statistically signi-
ficant coefficients show that income, import dependency and
structural differences between countries and periods are
important for the explanation of differing wheat price
protection levels.
2. Two interesting additional findings refer to differences
between 1976-80 and the earlier years. Equation (2) shows that
wheat price protection in industrialized countries was
affected by import dependency significantly more strongly in
1976-80 than in the rest of the period. One possible explana-
tion for this is that self-sufficiency arguments might have
become stronger over time as a determinant of wheat price
protection in industrialized countries. Equation (4) reveals
that wheat price protection in developing countries became
significantly more dependent on income compared with the
earlier years. Protection rose particularly strongly in the
periods 1976-80 with an increase in PPP-corrected GDP per
capita.
3. It has already been shown in Table 1 that wheat price pro-
tection in developing countries increased in the period 1968-
80 with a rising income. Equation (4) allows some conclusions
why this is so. A first explanation is that increases in in-
come in the sub-period 1976-80 caused a higher wheat price
protection. A second explanation is indicated by the fact that
the regression coefficient of the variable (D5 X INCOME) is
positive and significantly different from zero. This shows
that the influence of income has been clearly higher in Asian
newly-industrializing countries than in other developing
countries. It can be concluded that the overall positive in-
come elasticity of wheat price protection in developing
countries is mainly due to two reasons:
- that income became more important over time as a determinant
of wheat price protection; .
- that income played an important role for protection in Asian
newly-industrializing countries.- 17 -
The quantitative results on the impacts of income and import de-
pendency in wheat on price protection are conveniently summarized
as elasticity coefficients in Table 4. For all countries in the
period 1968-80 and for various disaggregations with respect to
Q
countries and time , it is shown how a 1% change in the PPP-
corrected GDP per capita (import dependency in wheat) affects the
nominal protection coefficient for wheat in percentage terms. The
following main results can be summarized:
1. In nearly all cases, the elasticities of wheat price pro-
tection are positive as expected. Exceptions are the develop-
ing countries in 1968-72, with a negative income elasticity of
price protection, and Japan, with a consistently negative
import-dependency elasticity of price protection.
2. The magnitude of the expected elasticity coefficients differs
clearly between countries and between sub-periods. The income
elasticity of the nominal protection coefficient for wheat is
the highest in Japan, and only for Japan is this elasticity
coefficient above unity. The income elasticity is in all
periods higher for industrialized than for developing
countries and higher in Northern non-EC countries than in the
EC. Within developing countries, it is higher for Asian NICs
than for the other countries. The income elasticity of the
nominal protection coefficient is generally higher in the
period of the commodity price boom than in the other years.
3. The import-dependency elasticities vary less between countries
and between periods than the income elasticities of protec-
9
tion . For those country groups with a positive import-
dependency elasticity, the coefficient is in no case higher
than 0.3.
Note that the magnitude of the elasticity will become higher in
absolute terms if price protection is measured by the nominal
rate of protection instead of the nominal protection coeffi-
cient . The reason is that the regression coefficient in the
linear model will remain constant, but the mean value of pro-
tection in the denominator of the elasticity coefficient will
fall by 100.- 18 -
Table 4: Income and Import Dependency Elasticities of Nominal Protection Coefficients for Wheat, 38 Countries,
1968-80
a
Period/Country or Inccme Elasticity of Wheat Price Import Dependency Elasticity of
Country Group Protection Wheat Price Protection
Period 1968-80:
All countries: 0.31 0.20
Industrialized countries: 0.84 0.19
Developing countries: 0.10 0.15
Period 1968-72:
All countries: 0.17 0.13
Industrialized countries: 0.85 0.13
Developing countries: -0.11 0.12
Japan: 2.36 -1.82
Northern countries: . 0.31 0.06
Asian NICs: 0.17 0.12
EC countries: 0.08 0.02
Period of 1973-75 (ccrmodity
price boom):





Developing countries: 0.04 0.30
Japan: 4.06 -2.91
Northern countries: 0.61 0.09
Asian NICs: 0.28 0.16
EC countries: 0.16 0.06
Period 1976-80:
All countries: 0.52 0.30
Industrialized countries: 1.05 0.24
Developing countries: 0.39 0.17
Japan: 1.95 -1.04
Northern countries: 0.61 0.06
Asian NICs: 0.57 0.12
EC countries: 0.47 0.04
a The income and import dependency elasticities are evaluated at mean values. They are taken or derived from Tables 1
to 3 and footnote 8 in the text. For the definitions of wheat price protection, income and import dependency in wheat,
see Table 1. On the country sample and the country groups used here, see Table 2 and footnote 2 in the text. The
elasticities for all countries, all industrialized and all developing countries are taken from Table 1 and are cal-
culated for 1973-75 from the equations in footnote 8 in the text. The elasticities for Japan are calculated from
equation 2 in Table 3. The elasticities for the Northern non-EC countries and the EC countries are confuted from
equation 4 in Table 2. The elasticities for the Asian NICs are calculated from equation 4 in Table 3. - The under-
lying regression coefficient is not statistically different from zero.
Source: Cwn computations.- 19 -
4 Conclusions for Future Research
This paper has addressed specific questions within the much
broader discussion on the levels and determinants of agricultural
protection. It will be a task for future research to extend the
findings of this paper:
1. In this contribution, only some determinants of agricultural
price protection were considered. The level of development,
the import status and structural differences between regions
and periods were stressed as important determinants of the
international pattern of protection. Anderson/Hayami (1986)
and Honma/Hayami (1986) have examined other determinants. They
have argued that the comparative advantage of agriculture, the
share of agriculture in the national economy and the terms of
trade between agriculture and industry are important deter-
minants of agricultural protection. A relatively high share of
the variation in the levels of protection were explained here
and in the papers of Anderson/Hayami and Honma/Hayami. There-
fore, it seems promising to combine these variables in order
to test comprehensively for the major determinants of pro-
tection. Of course, some problems of data availability and
estimation have to be solved in such a comprehensive
approach
2. The pattern of price protection across countries and over time
could be explained for other agricultural markets. A procedure
along the lines of this paper or an extended approach could be
adopted.
3. There is an important discussion on the appropriate measure of
12 agricultural protection . This branch of the literature has
not been touched here. It remains to be worked out how the
influence of income and import dependency on protection de-
pends on the measure of protection used.- 20 -
4. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the major impact on
the agricultural sector in developing countries stems from
general economic policy rather than agricultural price policy
[Krueger (1988), Krueger/Schiff/Valdes (19.88), Schiff (1988)].
Therefore, a comprehensive approach to examining agricultural
price protection or discrimination would have to include
indirect as well as direct agricultural policies.- 21 -
Summary
This article has quantitatively analyzed determinants of agri-
cultural price protection for one important product, wheat. A
pooled cross-country and time-series analysis for 38 wheat-
importing countries in the period 1968-80 has been carried out.
Major results are:
1. The level of economic development, the import dependency in
wheat and structural differences between countries and regions
are important determinants of the level of wheat price pro-
tection.
2. Wheat price protection increased for the aggregate sample with
a rising PPP-corrected GDP per capita and with a growing im-
port dependency in wheat. This general pattern is also valid
for most sub-samples.
3. The income elasticity of wheat price protection differs
clearly between countries and sub-periods. This, to a lesser
extent, also holds true for the import-dependency elasticity
of wheat price protection. The income elasticity of wheat
price protection is clearly higher for industrialized than for
developing countries. It is highest in Japan and higher in
Northern non-EC countries than in the EC. If protection is
measured with the nominal protection coefficient, the income
elasticity of wheat price protection is below unity both for
the total sample and in all sub-samples except Japan.
4. The extensive use of qualitative independent variables
provides a promising tool for measuring structural differences
in the international pattern of protection. They have been
introduced here as intercept-dummy and slope-dummy variables.
By this means, it can be tested for differences in the re-
gression coefficients across countries and over time within a
single econometric model. The approach presented here can be
fruitfully applied in future studies of the determinants of
agricultural protection.- 22 -
Notes
1 de Haen/Schafer (1987) report that their estimates yield no
statistically significant results when they exclude the
industrialized countries.
2 The countries included are: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yemen A.R., France, F.R.
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland, United Kingdom,
Finland, Hungary, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Yugoslavia,
Israel, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore.
3 A linear model specification is used throughout this paper as
the linear model outperformed a loglinear one in nearly each
case. For all countries in 1968-80, e.g., the estimated re-
gression equation for the determinants of wheat price pro-
tection is in the loglinear case:
In PR = -0.94749*** + 0.11251*** In INCOME
(-4.55) (4.35)
+ 0.06700*** In IMPORT DEPENDENCY
(3.64)
(R
2 = 0.07; F = 15.73; DF = 412)
The variables and the test statistics are defined in Table 1.
*** indicates the 0.1%_ level of statistical significance. It
can be seen that the R
2, F and t statistics worsen compared
with the corresponding linear equation in Table 1. The elasti-
city coefficients have the same sign in both specifications of
the model, but are slightly smaller in the loglinear model.
4 There are several studies available dealing with the parti-
cular hypotheses in more detail. Peterson (1979) argues that
industrialized countries protect agricultural producers more
than developing countries. Agricultural protectionism in Japan
is comprehensively surveyed in Fitchett (1988) . On agricul-
tural protection in the Northern countries, see OECD (1987a)
within an international perspective. The OECD (1987b) and the
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (1985) deal with agricultural
protection in the EC, and Anderson/Hayami/Honma (1986) discuss
agricultural protection in East Asia over time and in the
context of an international comparison.
5 Honma/Hayami (1986), e.g., include various intercept dummies
in their explanation of the structure of agricultural pro-
tection in industrialized countries, but no slope dummies.
They report in footnote 8 that experiments with slope dummies
were not successful.- 23 -
6 This procedure is also superior to the Chow test in order to
test for structural differences within a pooled regression
model. Only one regression is needed, a variety of hypotheses
can be tested with it, and the source of structural differen-
ces is clearly shown. See Gujarati (1988), section 14.8.
7 Note that the results from equation 1 in Table 2 are con-
sistent with those shown for the same period in Table 1. If
one adds the coefficient of the slope dummy, (Dl x INCOME), to
the coefficient of the income variable, this yields 0.02618
(-0.00635 + 0.01983). This is precisely the regression
coefficient of the income variable in Table 1 for in-
dustrialized countries in the period 1968-80.
8 Additionally to the conclusions of Table 1, regression
equations had to be estimated for the period of the commodity
price boom (1973-75). The result is for all countries:
PR = 42.519*** + 0.00793*** INCOME
(5.89) (4.51)
+ 0.469*** IMPORT DEPENDENCY
(6.06)
(R
2 = 0.28; F =23.12; DF = 111)
The estimated regression equation for the industrialized
countries is:
PR = -6.606 + 0.01794*** INCOME
(-0.28) (3.81)
+ 0.503*** IMPORT DEPENDENCY
(4.88)
(R
2 = 0.57; F = 19.81; DF = 30)
For the developing countries, the following regression was
run:
PR = 53.519*** + 0.00211 INCOME
(5.56) (0.56)
+ 0.441*** IMPORT DEPENDENCY
(4.19)
(R
2 = 0.16; F = 8.81; DF = 78)
The variables and the test statistics are defined as in Table
1. *** indicates the 0.1% level of statistical significance.
9 Note that these elasticities may differ between groups and
between periods although the regression coefficients in Table
2, which characterize the influence of import dependency on
protection, do not. The reason is that the elasticities are
also affected by the mean values of the dependent and in-
dependent variables.- 24 -
10 Balisacan/Roumasset (1987, p. 238) calculate an income elasti-
city of 3.23 for agricultural price protection in a cross-
country analysis for 68 market economies. This finding is not
necessarily inconsistent with those in Table 4, as Balisacan/
Roumasset use the nominal rate of protection and we utilize
the nominal protection coefficient. This will necessarily lead
to a different elasticity. The reason is as follows: The re-
gression coefficient in the linear model (3PR/3GDPC) will
remain unchanged when the nominal rate of protection is used
as dependent variable instead of the nominal protection co-
efficient. However, the mean value of the protection measure
is also needed in order to calculate the income elasticity of
protection. The mean value of the nominal rate of protection
is by 1 lower than the mean value of the nominal protection
coefficient or by 100 if both measures are expressed in per-
centage terms. Therefore, the income elasticity of price
protection
. 3PR . GDPC .
* 3GDPC ' PR '
is clearly higher when the nominal rate of protection instead
of the nominal protection coefficient is used.
11 Several explanatory variables in the approach of Anderson/
Hayami (1986) and Honma/Hayami (1986) are not readily avail-
able as time series. Hence, it is difficult to include them in
a pooled time-series and cross-country analysis. In order to
test for many determinants simultaneously, pooling .seems
necessary to get sufficient degrees of freedom. A joint intro-
duction of all important determinants of protection will also
cause severe multicollinearity problems. This is at least so
when structural differences between countries and periods are
modelled along the lines of this paper.
12 Seminal contributions on the measurement of protection include
Balassa and Associates (1971) and Corden (1971). On the
measurement of the protective impact of non-price inter-
ventions, see Deardorff/Stern (1984). The measurement of agri-
cultural protection is discussed in Scandizzo/Bruce (1980) and
Tangermann/Josling (1988).- 25 -
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